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REPORTER DENIED PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE
OF NEWS SOURCE
Garland v. Torre,
259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958)
The plaintiff, actress Judy Garland, brought a defamation action
against the Columbia Broadcasting Sy'stem in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff alleged
that the broadcasting system had made false and defamatory statements
about her and had authorized their publication in appellant Marie Torre's
newspaper column. C.B.S. denied making the statements or causing
them to be published. The columnist refused, in the course of a pre-trial
deposition hearing, to divulge the name of the "network executive" at
C.B.S. to whom her column attributed the statements. Upon her refusal
to obey an order of the district court that she reveal the name of the
source of her information, she was held in criminal contempt. The court
of appeals affirmed, holding that the first amendment guarantee of
freedom of the press did not relieve the journalist from the testimonial
duty to answer questions concerning the source of news printed, and
denying the columnist's assertion of an evidentiary privilege against the
order to disclose the name of her confidential source.1
Though conceding the validity of appellant's contention that com-
pulsory disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources of information
entails an abridgement of press freedom by imposing some limitation
upon the availability of news, the court's opinion eloquently maintains the
position that this liberty must be subordinated under the Constitution
when it threatens to impinge upon the orderly functioning of the ju-
dicial process, fundamental to and conservative of all rights in a free
society.
2
The civil liberties questions raised by the case of Marie Torre in-
volve a sharp conflict of principle between the vital public right, implied
by the first amendment, to the freest and fullest flow of public infor-
mation, much of which information becomes available only because the
informants are confident that their identities will not be disclosed, and
the vital public and private right to the unhampered administration of
justice, including the right of a litigant to enlist the judicial compulsion
of relevant testimony.' By withholding the identity of a source, the
1259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
2 See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 291 (1941) (dissenting
opinion) ; Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
3 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). The instant opinion,
supra note 1, at 549, maintains that "whether or not the freedom to invoke this
judicial power be considered an element of Fifth Amendment due process, its
essentiality to the fabric of our society is beyond controversy." S WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2191 (3d ed. 1940), takes the position that the fifth amendment does
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question which goes to the heart of the instant plaintiff's case, the
journalist defeats this public and private right of access to due process.
The journalist's proposed constitutional justification of that silence which
renders remedy unavailable to the injured party is invalidated by the
exclusion of libelous and defamatory statements from the pale of pro-
tection afforded by the first amendment freedom.
4
No such evidentiary privilege as that asserted by appellant to protect
her refusal to disclose the name of her informant has been held to exist
in the absence of a statute creating it.' Some trend of legislation is
apparent to extend the privilege for confidential communications to
afford reporters a statutory right to decline to identify in court, grand
jury or legislative investigatory proceedings the sources from whom they
had obtained published information. The number of bills which have
been introduced and the statutes effected by twelve states6 all purport to
establish an absolute privilege. This is tantamount to a legislative de-
cision that the public interest under the first amendment in a free flow
of information shall be paramount to the public interest in due process
in cases where the two come in conflict. Leading authorities in the field
of evidence have been emphatic in denouncing the tendency to thus
extend the privilege to suppress relevant evidence7 except in cases in
which the consequent harm of such interference with the rights of the
litigant and society to compel the disclosure of pertinent facts is greatly
outweighed by accompanying social benefits realized from the preser-
vation of a confidential relationship.'
secure the right to compulsory process for their witnesses to defendants, the sixth
amendment then giving the ordinary practice special recognition in the special case
of criminal defendants.
4 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
5 See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1951);
People ex rel. Mooney v. New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 4-15 (1936) ;
58 Ams. JUR. Wgitnesses § 546 (1948).
6 The states which have enacted such statutes are: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New
Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
7 Morgan, Fore-cord to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE 22-30 (1942) ; 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 2192, 2286 (3d ed. 1940).
8 Morgan, id. at 7, argues that "Such a privilege [against disclosure of
relevant data] suppresses valuable evidence to which the trier of fact is competent
to give its proper weight.... If [so serious an interference with a rational inquiry
as] privilege to suppress the truth is to be recognized at all, its limits should be
sharply determined so as to coincide with the limits of the benefits it creates .... 3
REPORT, NEW YORK LAW REVISION COM'MISSION 134 (1949), recommends quali-
fying such privilege, suggesting that the public interest in news of entertainment
personalities should readily give way in the face of conflicting policies. Some bills
would qualify the privilege by excepting instances in which disclosure is held
necessary in the interests of national security. It is arguable, however, that there
is more reason for granting the privilege in cases involving this interest than in
those involving the interests of the administration of justice, since the public's right
to information is perhaps most urgent in cases where the "interests of national
1959[
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No privilege protecting the reporter from disclosing his source
having been created by New York9 or by federal statute, there was no
legal right upon which appellant Torre could base her suppression of
evidence. It was unnecessary for the federal district court sitting in
New York to decide whether federal or state law was determinative of
the question. This issue, however, assumes paramount importance when
considered as it might arise in a federal court sitting in Ohio1" or any
one of the other eleven states which have granted the journalist this
immunity by statute.
The state law seems to control the disposition of the question under
the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins," which would ensure that "the
outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be the same, so far
as legal rules determine the outcome of the litigation, as it would be if
tried in a state court."'" The rule as to privilege allowing the admission
or exclusion of the testimony under the instant facts, however, would
not be determinative of the ultimate legal and factual issues in the case,
the defamatory character of the statements alleged to have been made
and the network's liability therefor. It does determine whether or not
the issues can be framed for litigation. If plaintiff cannot discover the
network source and establish the necessary agency relationship, she is
unable to counter the network's denial of responsibility for the state-
ments. The matter of privilege has nevertheless been classified as sub-
security" can be claimed by investigators or prosecutors-a right to information
probably obtainable in such cases only by the reporter's pledge of anonymity to his
source.
9 REPORT, NEW YORK LAW REVISION CoMMISsIoN, supra note 8, at 23-168,
comprehensively treats the issues raised by the enactment of such legislation and
disapproves the proposal to enact a statute granting the privilege in New York.
10 OHIO REV. CODE § 2739.12 (1953), grants newspaper reporters the privilege
against revealing the source of their information.
11304 U.S. 64 (1938).
12 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). (Emphasis added.)
Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Court, 36 MIcH. S.B.J. 34-
(1957), suggests that the courts in their attempt to define the rule-making power
must go beyond the substance-procedure analysis and examine the policy behind
the proposed rule to determine whether or not the purpose and effect of the rule
involves the orderly dispatch of judicial business or is predicated on another
broader policy of the state. And Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or
Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REV. 467, 483 (1957), offers this rationale: "When legis-
latures draft codes of procedure, they frequently, if not usually, include rules
governing . . . the privileges of witnesses, and when they include rules as to
evidence . . . they make provision for the use of privileged communications. This
warrants the conclusion that when a legislature . . . delegates to the courts the
function of regulating procedure, it intends to include the subject of privileges and
privileged communications .... They are nothing more or less than privileges to
suppress the truth, and no officers . . . other than the judiciary have the constant
opportunity to observe them in operation and the skill to determine how far and
in what respects they interfere with the orderly and effective administration of
justice."
[Vol. 20
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stance in terms of the Erie substance-procedure dichotomy, and thus
declared beyond the rule-making power.13
Federal Rule 43 rejects this as the sole test and requires the appli-
cation of a three-pronged test of admissibility:
All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the
statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence
heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the
hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied
in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the
United States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule
which favors the reception of the evidence governs .... 14
As the policy of the rule favors the admission of evidence, and testi-
mony as to a journalist's source being "admissible under the statutes of
the United States" absent a statute providing for its exclusion, it would
appear that a federal rule denying the privilege should control over a
state statute restricting admissibility. 5 Rule 43 has been interpreted to
indicate that the Erie doctrine does not preclude the adoption of federal
evidence rules,'" but in the field of privilege state law has been held to
be supreme." One federal district court, though stating it did not con-
sider the matter one of substance and thus was not bound by Erie to
apply the state law in determining whether evidence was privileged
under the federal rule relating to the scope of examination of deponents,
felt itself nevertheless bound to recognize the state statute creating the
privilege as the "clear and unequivocal pronouncement of the public
policy of the state in which [the federal court] sits."'"
Putting aside considerations of the wisdom or folly of the state
legislatures in clothing the sources of a journalist's information with
secrecy, it is submitted that such statutory grants of privilege should be
considered as no more than a part of the judicial machinery and method
13E.g., Berdon v. McDuff, 15 F.R.D. 29 (D.C.E.D. Mich. 1953).
14 FED. R. Cir. P. 43 (b).
i See Green, The Admissibility of Evidence under the Federal Rules,
55 HARv. L. REV. 197, 203-05 (1941), which under this analysis would allow the
federal court to use its discretion as to whether the privilege would apply in any
given case.
16 Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941), sustained the federal requirement
for a physical examination against the contention that one would not be available
in the state courts.
17Supra note 12. 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 43.07, at 1332-33 (3d ed.
1951), argues that state statutes would control since the state statutes were fol-
lowed by the federal equity courts. Green, supra note 14, questions the validity of
this premise.
18 Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351 (D.C.N.D. Ala. 1953). In this first federal
case dealing with the claim of privilege by a journalist with respect to the sources
of his information, the court stated that it was not bound to apply Alabama law
granting the privilege in interpreting Rule 26, which permits examination of
deponents "regarding any matter not privileged which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
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which the state devises because it has adjudged the particular procedure
to contribute to the most efficient operation of its particular judicial
machine. Considering the validity of federal evidence rules, the United
States Supreme Court has declared the test to be "whether a rule really
regulates procedure, . . . the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for disregard or infraction of them. .. .
In diversity cases the federal courts are vested with the power to
enforce substantive rights as recognized by the state and to justly ad-
minister relief. It would seem to strip the gears of the federal judicial
machinery to require it to conform, under what is well-criticized as a
misapplication of the Erie decision, to state statutes at variance with its
judgment as to the manner and means by which it can most efficiently
function to give operational effect to the state's substantive law.
Ruth S. Harwitz
19 Supra note 16, at 14.
